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What Determines Residual Income? 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of residual income scaled by book value of 
equity, i.e., abnormal return on equity (ROE), by analyzing the impact of value-creation 
(economic rents) and value-recording (conservative accounting) processes on abnormal 
ROE. I rely on economic theories to characterize economic rents and develop an empirical 
measurethe conservative accounting factorto capture the effect of conservative 
accounting. As expected, industry abnormal ROE increases with industry concentration, 
industry level barriers to entry, and industry conservative accounting factors. Also as 
expected, the difference between firm and industry abnormal ROE increases with market 
share, firm size, firm level barriers to entry, and firm conservative accounting factors. 
Integrating these determinants into the residual income valuation model significantly 
increases its explanatory power for the variation in the market-to-book ratio.  
 
Key Words: equity valuation; the residual income valuation model; economic rents; 
conservative accounting. 
Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from sources identified in the 
text. 
JEL Classification: D4, G12, M4. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The residual income valuation model (RIM) provides a parsimonious framework 
linking accounting information to firm value. It has been widely used to estimate firm 
value and the cost of equity.1 The RIM model states that firm value is the sum of book 
value and the present value of expected future residual income. Thus, forecasting future 
residual income is critical to RIM implementations. Prior research often relies on the 
linear information dynamics proposed by Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
for this purpose. However, Dechow et al. (1999) and Myers (1999) find that these 
information dynamics combined with the RIM fail to capture firm value effectively. This 
failure calls for a better understanding of the determinants of residual income (Beaver 
1999).  
To this end, this paper first investigates the impact of value-creation (economic 
rents) and value-recording (conservative accounting) processes on residual income scaled 
by book value of equity, i.e., abnormal return on equity (ROE). It then examines whether 
integrating economic and accounting determinants of abnormal ROE into the RIM can 
improve its ability to explain firm value.  
This paper hypothesizes that abnormal ROE increases with economic rent proxies 
and conservative accounting factors. It relies on theories of competition to identify proxies 
for economic rents. These proxies measure the extent of imperfect competition, under 
which firms can price products above marginal costs and earn positive abnormal ROE. 
Conservative accounting, such as expensing investments with future benefits, can cause 
recorded earnings and book value of equity to differ from economic measures and lead to 
nonzero abnormal ROE. To capture the impact of conservatism on abnormal ROE, I 
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develop an empirical measure, the conservative accounting factor. This factor takes into 
consideration the impact of conservatism on both net income and book value of equity.  
This paper assumes that abnormal ROE follows a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) 
process and allows the AR(1) parameter (i.e., persistence) to vary with economic rent 
proxies and conservative accounting factors. Because industry abnormal ROE is likely to 
have different persistence from firm differential abnormal ROE (the difference between 
firm and industry abnormal ROE), the empirical analyses are conducted separately at the 
industry level and the firm level. The industry level analysis suggests that the persistence 
of industry abnormal ROE increases with industry concentration, industry level barriers to 
entry, and industry conservative accounting factors. The firm level analysis suggests that 
the persistence of firm differential abnormal ROE increases with market share, firm size, 
firm level barriers to entry, and firm conservative accounting factors.  
Like the persistence of abnormal ROE, its permanent level (i.e., the unconditional 
mean) might also vary systematically across industries and firms, especially over finite 
horizons analyzed in empirical studies (Mueller 1977; Zhang 2000). The abnormal ROE 
analyses are then extended to explain the permanent level of abnormal ROE. The results 
suggest that the permanent level increases with economic rent proxies and conservative 
accounting factors as well. 
Lastly, this paper conducts market-to-book ratio analyses to investigate the extent to 
which economic and accounting determinants of abnormal ROE improve RIM 
implementations. Integrating these determinants into a model with current abnormal ROE 
and other factors examined in prior research increases the explanatory power (i.e., the 
adjusted R2) by 40 percent and 33 percent for industry and firm market-to-book ratio, 
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respectively. Additional analyses indicate that these determinants have incremental 
explanatory power over models analyzed in prior studies (Fairfield et al. 1996; Bhojraj 
and Lee 2002). 
This study contributes to the valuation literature in three ways. First, it provides a 
framework for forecasting future residual income and improves our understanding of the 
link between current and future accounting information. It decomposes abnormal ROE 
into an economic rent component and a conservative accounting component, and finds that 
both components significantly improve forecasts of abnormal ROE and the ability of the 
RIM to explain firm value.2 Such evidence is important for both valuation studies and 
studies that rely on the RIM valuation framework, such as value relevance studies, by 
suggesting a list of economic and accounting variables that can capture the cross-sectional 
variation in firm value. 
Second, it provides insights into the impact of economic rents on abnormal ROE. 
Extending prior research, including Lev (1983) and Baginski et al. (1999), this paper 
studies both the persistence of abnormal ROE and its permanent level. This paper also 
uses a more comprehensive set of economic rent proxies. This is important given that 
different economic rent proxies likely correlate with each other (Porter 1980). The 
analyses suggest that industry concentration, firm size, market share, and barriers to entry 
all positively affect future abnormal ROE.  
Third, while prior research recognizes the impact of conservatism on accounting 
numbers (e.g., Zhang 2000), there is limited research on how to empirically capture such 
impact. This paper develops an empirical measure to capture the impact of conservatism 
on abnormal ROE for individual firms. This measure reflects the notion that the 
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conservative accounting effect is contingent on the growth of investments recorded 
conservatively: the effect is negative when the growth is high and positive when the 
growth is low. Empirical results indicate that this measure helps forecast future abnormal 
ROE of individual firms and industries. Thus, this paper extends prior empirical studies on 
conservative accounting, such as Lev et al. (1999) and Monahan (1999), which use a 
portfolio approach to demonstrate the effect of capitalizing R&D expenditures on 
contemporaneous performance measures and returns-earnings associations, among other 
things. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II analyzes economic 
and accounting factors that affect abnormal ROE and presents hypotheses. Section III 
describes sample selection and variable measurement. Section IV reports the abnormal 
ROE analyses and Section V reports the market-to-book ratio analyses. Section VI 
concludes. 
 
II. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Assuming that accounting satisfies the clean surplus relation (the change in book 
value of equity equals net income minus net dividends) and that the intrinsic value of 
equity equals the present value of future net dividends, one can represent the intrinsic 
value of equity (Vt) by the residual income valuation model (RIM):  
]
)r1(
X
[EBVV
1
a
ttt
t∑∞
= ++=
+
τ
τ
τ ,      (1) 
where BVt is book value of equity, Et(.) is the expectation at time t, atX  is residual 
income, and r is the cost of equity, which is used to discount all future payoffs to equity 
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holders. Residual income denotes the difference between net income (Xt) and the required 
return from beginning-of-period book value of equity, i.e., 1tt
a
t rBVXX −−= . Basically, 
the RIM model states that firm value is the sum of book value and the present value of 
expected future residual income.  
Accordingly, forecasting residual income is critical to implementations of the RIM 
model. To improve the forecasts, this paper investigates the determinants of residual 
income. Since analysis of residual income is potentially subject to scale problems (Brown 
et al. 1999), this paper focuses on abnormal ROE ( atROE ), residual income scaled by 
book value of equity, or the difference between ROE and the cost of equity. In terms of 
abnormal ROE, the RIM model can be rewritten as: 
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The RIM model holds under both unbiased accounting and conservative accounting. 
Under unbiased accounting, a firm’s ROE equals its cost of equity if the firm operates 
under perfect competition. However, if the competition is imperfect, the firm can charge 
prices higher than its costs; accordingly, economic rents arise and abnormal ROE is no 
longer zero.  
Under conservative accounting, accounting measures deviate from economic 
measures. As a result, accounting ROE is different from economic rate of return, and a 
firm’s abnormal ROE can be nonzero even if the firm operates under perfect competition. 
That is, conservative accounting is also an important determinant of abnormal ROE 
(Ohlson 1995; Feltham and Ohlson 1995, 1996; Zhang 2000). Below, I first decompose 
abnormal ROE under conservative accounting into a conservative accounting component 
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and an economic rent component, and then discuss these two components in detail.  
 
Economic Rents, Conservative Accounting, and Abnormal ROE 
Suppose that the clean surplus relations under unbiased and conservative accounting 
are: 
t
'
t
'
1t
'
t dXBVBV −+= − , 
tt1tt dXBVBV −+= − , 
where d is net dividends, which are assumed to be the same under the two accounting 
systems, i.e., net dividends are not affected by accounting policies. Accounting numbers 
under unbiased accounting are denoted by “ ' ”.  
Subtracting the second equation from the first one yields: 
t
'
t1t
'
1tt
'
t XXBVBVBVBV −+−=− −− . 
The difference in book value of equity between unbiased and conservative accounting is 
defined as the estimated reserve (ER), as in Penman and Zhang (2002). The estimated 
reserve can be interpreted as a measure of how conservative an accounting system is. As 
in Feltham and Ohlson (1996) and Gjesdal (1999), conservative accounting is defined 
such that the carrying value assigned to investments yields an expected accounting rate of 
return greater than the internal rate of return. Thus, the estimated reserve is positive under 
conservative accounting and the higher the estimated reserve, the more conservative the 
accounting system. 
In terms of the estimated reserve, the above equation can be written as: 
1ttt
'
t ERERXX −−=− .     (2) 
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That is, the difference in net income under the two accounting systems is the change in the 
estimated reserve. Net income under conservative accounting is lower than that under 
unbiased accounting if the estimated reserve increases, and vice versa.  
Dividing both sides of equation (2) by beginning-of-period book value of equity 
under conservative accounting and after some algebra, one can obtain the relation between 
conservative accounting, economic rents, and abnormal ROE: 
.)
BV
ER1(ROECAF
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ER1(ROE
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ERER)r1(ROE
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−
−
−
−
++=
++−+=
   (3) 
See Appendix A for the derivation. This equation suggests that abnormal ROE under 
conservative accounting consists of two components. The first component, referred to as 
the conservative accounting factor (CAF), captures the impact of conservatism on 
abnormal ROE. The second component captures the impact of economic rentsabnormal 
ROE under unbiased accounting.  
 
Conservative Accounting Factor 
Conservatism is “a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainty 
and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered (FASB 1980, 2).” One 
prime example of conservatism under U.S. accounting is the expensing of R&D 
expenditures. Because the benefits from R&D expenditures are uncertain, these 
investments are not recognized as assets and are required to be expensed.3 Expensing an 
investment with future benefits has a negative impact on abnormal ROE in the investment 
period and a positive impact for the rest of its useful life. If the growth of investments is 
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high, the negative impact of contemporaneous investments on current abnormal ROE 
dominates the positive impact of past investments, and if the growth is low, the positive 
impact dominates the negative impact. The quantitative impact of conservatism on 
abnormal ROE can be captured by the conservative accounting factor developed above 
(see equation 3):4  
1t
1tt1t
1t
t1t
t BV
rER)ERER(
BV
ERER)r1(CAF
−
−−
−
− +−=−+= . 
Basically, CAF is the inverse change in the estimated reserve (i.e., the net income effect) 
after adjusting for the opportunity cost of the beginning-of-period estimated reserve (i.e., 
the book value effect).5  
The above discussion and equation (3) lead to the first hypothesis (in alternative 
form): 
H1: Abnormal ROE increases with conservative accounting factors. 
 
Economic Rents 
Competition within an industry can drive prices down to marginal costs so that the 
net present value of an investment and industry abnormal ROE under unbiased accounting 
are zero. However, imperfect competition can lead to economic rents, and the less 
competitive an environment is, the higher economic rents are.  
Neo-classical economic theories suggest that the level of competition and economic 
rents depend on industry structure, i.e., industry concentration and industry level barriers 
to entry. Concentration can yield economic rents because firms in a concentrated industry 
can collude and set prices above marginal costs so that they can have positive abnormal 
ROE. As predicted by oligopoly theories, the effectiveness of collusion increases with 
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concentration (Bain 1956; Strickland and Weiss 1976). Barriers to entry, on the other 
hand, can induce and sustain economic rents by reducing threats from outside competition. 
Product innovations (temporary monopoly power), product differentiation (buyer inertia 
and loyalty), capital intensity (minimum required capital), scarce resources, patents, and 
immobile management talents all could result in high barriers to entry (Eaton and Lipsey 
1981; Mueller 1977).  
These discussions lead to the second hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H2: Abnormal ROE increases with industry concentration and industry level barriers 
to entry. 
If firms in an industry are not homogeneous as assumed in neo-classical economic 
theories, then firm characteristics, such as market share, firm size, or firm level barriers to 
entry, can affect profitability as well (Brozen 1971; Martin 1983). Firms with large market 
share enjoy economic rents because large market share leads to economies of scale and 
increased bargaining power in an oligopoly. Similarly, large firms can enjoy economies of 
scale in both the product market and the financing market. Furthermore, Mueller (1986) 
argues that firm level barriers to entry are more important than industry level barriers to 
entry in protecting firms from outside competition.  
These discussions lead to the last hypothesis (in alternative form): 
H3: Abnormal ROE increases with market share, firm size, and firm level barriers to 
entry.  
One can express firm abnormal ROE ( at,iROE ) as the sum of industry abnormal ROE 
( a t,jROE ) and firm differential abnormal ROE (
a
t,iDROE ): 
a
t,i
a
t,j
a
t,i DROEROEROE += , 
 10
where j stands for the industry to which firm i belongs. Because industry abnormal ROE 
varies with industry characteristics and firm differential abnormal ROE varies with firm 
characteristics, these two components might have different persistence.6 Accordingly, this 
paper analyzes them separately. The industry level analysis examines how industry 
characteristics affect industry abnormal ROE and the firm level analysis examines how 
firm characteristics affect firm differential abnormal ROE.7  
 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
 
Sample Selection 
All firm-year observations in the period 1976-1997 with available data on abnormal 
ROE and firm characteristics from the 1998 Compustat database are used in the abnormal 
ROE analyses. The sample period begins with 1976, when there are enough observations 
to estimate the predicted future industry abnormal ROE (which is used in the firm 
abnormal ROE analyses, and the estimation of which is described in Section IV). The 
sample period ends with 1997 due to the need for one-year-ahead abnormal ROE. 
Regulated firms, including financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and 
utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999), are excluded because their operations are 
markedly different from other firms.8 Observations with book value of equity less than $1 
million and those with abnormal ROE greater than 100 percent or less than -100 percent 
(2.2 percent of the original sample) are dropped to reduce the influence of extreme values. 
The final sample consists of 3,270 observations for the industry abnormal ROE analyses 
and 22,536 observations for the firm abnormal ROE analyses. The sample for the market-
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to-book ratio analyses is described in Section V. 
 
Variable Measurement 
Firm abnormal ROE  
Firm abnormal ROE is measured as the difference between ROE and the industry 
cost of equity, where ROE is measured as net income before extraordinary items available 
for common equity deflated by beginning-of-period book value of equity. The industry 
cost of equity is the sum of the annualized one-month T-bill yield and the industry equity 
premium. This latter term is estimated from the conditional three-factor model as studied 
in Fama and French (1997). This paper uses the industry cost of equity because it contains 
smaller measurement errors than the firm cost of equity (Fama and French 1997). 
Firm characteristics 
Market share is measured as the ratio of a firm’s sales to total industry sales. Firm 
size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. This paper uses three proxies for 
barriers to entry: R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales) for product 
innovation, advertising intensity (the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales) for product 
differentiation, and capital intensity (the ratio of depreciation, depletion and amortization 
expenses to sales) for minimum required capital. However, high capital intensity could 
also result in low abnormal ROE due to high capacity adjustment costs (Lev 1983). Thus, 
the direction of the impact of capital intensity is unclear. 
Conservative accounting factors are calculated for R&D and advertising 
expenditures. The R&D reserve is the unamortized portion of R&D assets generated by 
current and past R&D expenditures if these expenditures were capitalized. Similarly for 
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the advertising reserve. R&D assets are amortized using the coefficients reported in Lev 
and Sougiannis (1996). Advertising assets are amortized using an accelerated method 
(sum-of-year digits over two years), as in Penman and Zhang (2002).  
Note that economic rents and conservative accounting effects might be related. For 
example, successful R&D investments can affect abnormal ROE through both economic 
rents and conservative accounting factors. These two effects are conceptually 
distinguishable though. While abnormal ROE due to economic rents increases with the 
level of R&D expenditures, abnormal ROE due to conservative accounting depends on 
both the level and the growth of R&D expenditures. These effects are empirically 
distinguishable if their empirical proxies, R&D intensity and the R&D conservative 
accounting factor, are not highly correlated. The correlation between these two variables is 
low (-0.05) in the sample.9 Similar arguments and correlation evidence apply to 
advertising expenditures.10  
Industry abnormal ROE and industry characteristics 
Industries are classified on the basis of 3-digit SIC codes. Industry abnormal ROE, 
economic rent proxies (except concentration), and conservative accounting factors are 
weighted averages of accompanying firm measures. The weight for an industry measure is 
the denominator used to calculate the accompanying firm measure. For example, the 
weight for industry abnormal ROE is beginning-of-period book value of equity. Industry 
concentration is proxied by the Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of squared market 
shares of all firms in an industry. The higher the Herfindahl index, the more concentrated 
the industry is. 
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Other factors 
Prior research suggests that special items, accruals, and the magnitude of abnormal 
ROE might negatively affect the persistence of firm performance (Brooks and Buckmaster 
1976; Fairfield et al. 1996; Sloan 1996). Accordingly, the empirical analyses include these 
variables, referred to as other factors, as control variables when analyzing the incremental 
explanatory power of economic rent proxies and conservative accounting factors. These 
variables are measured in absolute values, and special items and total accruals are scaled 
by beginning-of-period book value of equity, as done in prior research. 
Variable measurement is summarized in Appendix B.  
Descriptive statistics  
Panel A of Table 1 reports variable means and medians at the industry and firm 
levels. Industry abnormal ROE has a mean of -0.017 and firm abnormal ROE has a mean 
of -0.053.11 The cost of equity is around 0.14. On average, a firm enjoys five percent of 
the product market and has about $130 million of assets (the table reports log values.) The 
Herfindahl index for an industry is around 0.24. R&D expenditures are around 1.5 percent 
of sales for average industries and three percent for average firms; advertising intensity is 
around two percent and capital intensity is around four percent.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
At the firm level, unrecognized assets from R&D and advertising expenditures equal 
16 percent and two percent of book value of equity, respectively. The ratios are nine 
percent and three percent at the industry level. As discussed in Section II, conservative 
accounting policies increase abnormal ROE for firms with high growth in investments and 
decrease abnormal ROE for those with low growth; thus the average conservative 
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accounting factor is around zero.  
While the magnitude of special items is relatively small, about two percent of book 
value of equity, the absolute value of total accruals is about 18 percent of book value of 
equity. The absolute value of industry abnormal ROE and firm differential abnormal ROE 
are on average 0.07 and 0.12, respectively.  
Panel B reports the correlations between variables, the upper triangle for industry 
characteristics and the lower triangle for firm characteristics. Although most correlations 
are significantly different from zero, they are generally small and the regressions are not 
subject to multicollinearity based on the condition index (Belsley et al. 1980).12 
 
IV. ABNORMAL ROE ANALYSES 
Assuming that industry and firm differential abnormal ROE follows an AR(1) 
process, this section examines whether the AR(1) parameters vary with economic rent 
proxies and conservative accounting factors as hypothesized above.13 I first report results 
when economic rent proxies and conservative accounting factors are used to explain the 
persistence of industry abnormal ROE and firm differential abnormal ROE. I then extend 
the analyses by allowing the permanent level of abnormal ROE to vary as well. A 
discussion of sensitivity tests concludes this section. 
 
The Industry Abnormal ROE Analysis 
This subsection investigates whether industry economic rent proxies and 
conservative accounting factors help predict future abnormal ROE using the following 
regression:  
 15
1tt
a
t4t
a
t3
t
a
t2t
a
t1
a
t00
a
1t
factorsOtherROEfactorsaccountingveConservatiROE
entrytoBarriersROEionConcentratROEROEROE
+
+
+×+×
+×+×++=
εαα
αααφ
 (4) 
The industry subscript is dropped from all variables for ease of notation. Industry 
characteristics are mean-adjusted within each year so that α0 represents the average 
persistence of industry abnormal ROE. See Appendix B for variable measurement. H1 and 
H2 imply that coefficients on concentration, barriers to entry (except capital intensity), 
and conservative accounting factors are positive.  
Table 2 reports yearly regression results. T-statistics of average coefficients are used 
to test significance levels (Fama and MacBeth 1973). As in the regressions presented 
below, all independent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the 
influence of extreme values. For comparison purposes, Column A reports results when 
only the current industry abnormal ROE and other factors are included. The average 
persistence of industry abnormal ROE is 0.79. Consistent with prior research, special 
items, total accruals, and the magnitude of industry abnormal ROE have negative 
coefficients. 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
Column B reports the results from the full model. Although the impact of 
concentration is insignificant, the impact of barriers to entry is significantly positive, as 
expected. Also as expected, the R&D conservative accounting factor has a significantly 
positive impact. The advertising conservative accounting factor has an insignificant 
coefficient, probably due to the short useful life of advertising investments (Kothari et al. 
2002). Overall, including industry economic rent proxies and conservative accounting 
factors significantly increases the explanatory power. The adjusted R2 increases from 0.61 
in Column A to 0.64 in Column B, significant at the 0.0257 level based on Wald tests.14,15 
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The Firm Abnormal ROE Analysis 
This subsection investigates whether firm economic rent proxies and conservative 
accounting factors help predict firm abnormal ROE using the following regression: 
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The firm subscript is dropped from all variables except the predicted future industry 
abnormal ROE ( a t,jEOˆR 1+ ), for which subscript j represents industry j to which the firm 
belongs. a t,jEOˆR 1+  is used to capture the industry component of future firm abnormal 
ROE.16 Firm characteristics are mean-adjusted within each year so that α0 represents the 
average persistence of firm differential abnormal ROE. See Appendix B for variable 
measurement. H1 and H3 suggest that coefficients on market share, firm size, barriers to 
entry (except capital intensity), and conservative accounting factors are positive.  
Table 3 reports yearly regression results. For comparison purposes, Column A only 
includes predicted future industry abnormal ROE, current firm differential abnormal ROE, 
and other factors, and Column B reports the results from the full model. As expected, the 
impact of market share, firm size, and barriers to entry is significantly positive. The 
coefficient on the R&D conservative accounting factor is significantly positive as 
predicted, but that on the advertising conservative accounting factor is insignificant. 
Overall, incorporating firm economic characteristics and conservative accounting factors 
significantly increases the explanatory power. The adjusted R2 increases from 0.30 in 
Column A to 0.34 in Column B, significant at the 0.0003 level based on Wald tests. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
In sum, the results in this and the previous subsection suggest that as expected, 
economic rent proxies and conservative accounting factors are positively associated with 
the persistence of abnormal ROE. Allowing the persistence to vary with these 
determinants increases the explanatory power by five percent and 13 percent for industry 
and firm differential abnormal ROE, respectively. 
  
Explaining the Permanent Level of Abnormal ROE 
While allowing the persistence of the AR(1) process to vary, the above analyses 
assume its intercept, which captures the mean abnormal ROE, to be constant across 
industries and firms. Prior research suggests that this assumption might not hold. Mueller 
(1977) argues that because firms spend resources to maintain barriers to entry and 
economic rents, there might be permanent differences in profitability across industries and 
firms. Consistent with this argument, Mueller (1977) finds that firm profitability does not 
converge to the competitive rate of return. Mueller (1986) further argues that these 
differences vary systematically with industry and firm characteristics. Similarly, Zhang 
(2000) models the impact of conservative accounting on earnings in a steady state and 
shows that the impact could be nonzero and varies with industry and firm characteristics 
as well.  
This subsection extends the above analyses by allowing the mean abnormal ROE, 
referred to as the permanent level, to vary with economic rent proxies and conservative 
accounting factors. Since the intercept of an AR(1) process is the product of the mean and 
one minus the persistence, the regression equation for industry abnormal ROE becomes:17 
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where both the permanent level (ROEa) and the persistence (ρ) are expressed as functions 
of economic rent proxies and conservative accounting factors: 
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Coefficients α’s capture the impact on the persistence, as in equation (4), and coefficients 
β’s capture the impact on the permanent level.  
Table 4 reports yearly regression results. Since the regression equation is non-linear 
in the coefficients, the non-linear OLS regression method is used.18 The results for 
persistence are similar to those reported in Table 2. The impact of industry concentration 
on the permanent level is significantly positive, suggesting that concentrated industries 
can earn positive abnormal ROE in the long run. R&D intensity and advertising intensity 
have a significantly positive impact, as expected. Capital intensity has a negative impact 
(marginally significant). Conservative accounting factors have a positive impact on the 
permanent level, as expected. Overall, controlling for the impact of industry 
characteristics on both the persistence and the permanent level increases the adjusted R2 
from 0.61 in Column A, when only current industry abnormal ROE and other factors are 
included, to 0.67 in Column B, significant at the 0.0012 level.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The regression equation for firm abnormal ROE is constructed similarly and Table 5 
reports regression results. The results for persistence are similar to those reported in Table 
3. The impact of both market share and firm size on the permanent level is significantly 
positive. The impact of barriers to entry is mixedmarginally significantly positive for 
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R&D intensity, insignificant for advertising intensity, and significantly negative for capital 
intensity. The impact of the R&D conservative accounting factor is significantly positive, 
but that of the advertising conservative accounting factor is insignificant. Overall, the 
adjusted R2 increases from 0.31 in Column A to 0.37 in Column B, significant at the 
0.0001 level.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Comparing the results in Table 4 with those in Table 2, or Table 5 with Table 3, 
suggests that controlling for the cross-sectional variation in the permanent level further 
increases the explanatory power. Untabulated results suggest that the increases are 
significant. In sum, compared to a model with current abnormal ROE and other factors, 
using economic rent proxies and conservative accounting factors to explain the variation 
in both the persistence of abnormal ROE and its permanent level increases the adjusted R2 
by ten percent and 20 percent for industry and firm abnormal ROE analyses, respectively.  
 
Sensitivity Tests 
Industry classification. Industry classification involves a trade-off between 
homogeneity of firms in the same industry and appropriate classification for diversified 
firms. The more detailed the industry classification, the more homogenous the non-
diversified firms in an industry are, but the more problematic is the classification for 
diversified firms. Unfortunately, there is no agreement on appropriate industry 
classification. Using 4-digit SIC industries or the industry classification in Fama and 
French (1997) yields similar results. 
Variable measurement. First, using total market share of the four largest firms in an 
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industry, instead of the Herfindahl index, to proxy for industry concentration yields 
similar results. Second, the results based on alternative estimates of the industry equity 
premium are similar: (1) the average historical equity premium for all industries (0.0516, 
as reported in Fama and French 1997), (2) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and (3) 
the three-factor model. Using the firm cost of equity estimated from CAPM or the three-
factor model also yields similar results. Third, the impact of market share and firm size 
could be confounded by diversification because market share and firm size might be 
correlated with diversification and diversification can result in a deviation of firm 
performance from the industry level (Mueller 1977). Controlling for diversification 
(measured as the sum of squared sales shares of all industry segments in the firm) does not 
change the inferences.  
Finally, because the measurement of certain variables (capital intensity, firm size, 
special items, and total accruals) is affected by accounting choices, their coefficients 
might be confounded by conservative accounting effects. Using alternative measurements 
that are less likely to be affected by accounting choicesthe ratio of plant, property, and 
equipment to sales as a proxy for capital intensity, natural logarithm of sales for firm size, 
and special items and total accruals scaled by salesyields similar results.  
Model estimation. This paper does not analyze the impact of financial leverage on 
abnormal ROE based on the notion that financial activities do not create abnormal profits 
and are accounted for unbiasedly (Feltham and Ohlson 1995). Controlling for financial 
leverage in the empirical analyses by adding a main effect and an interaction with current 
abnormal ROE does not affect the inferences. Also, estimating pooled regressions yields 
similar results. 
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V. MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO ANALYSES 
The abnormal ROE analyses suggest that the determinants of abnormal ROE can 
improve forecasts of one-period-ahead abnormal ROE. However, if the information 
dynamic of abnormal ROE differs from an AR(1) process, investigating only one-period-
ahead abnormal ROE is insufficient for valuation purposes. For instance, untabulated 
analyses suggest that an AR(2) process is more descriptive than an AR(1) process for 
about 35 percent of the industries with at least 25 years of consecutive data. Thus, this 
section directly links the determinants of abnormal ROE to firm value, i.e., the market-to-
book ratio, to examine the extent to which integrating these determinants improves 
valuation implementations.  
Like the abnormal ROE analyses, the market-to-book ratio analyses are conducted at 
both the industry and firm levels. Market value is measured four months after fiscal-year-
ends so that the capital markets can integrate the information in the current year’s 
financial statements. It is calculated as market value at fiscal-year-ends multiplied by 
cumulated returns in the four months afterwards. Overall, 3,396 industry-year 
observations and 19,898 firm-year observations in the period 1976-1997 are used in the 
industry and the firm market-to-book ratio analyses, respectively.19 As reported in Panel A 
of Table 1, the mean of industry market-to-book ratios is 1.947 and the mean of firm 
market-to-book ratios is 1.944.  
 
The Industry Market-to-book Ratio Analysis 
The regression specification for the market-to-book ratio analyses is derived from 
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the RIM model. Scaling both sides of equation (1′) under unbiased accounting by book 
value of equity under conservative accounting indicates that the market-to-book ratio (a) 
increases with the difference in book value of equity between unbiased and conservative 
accounting, i.e., the estimated reserve, (b) decreases with the cost of equity, (c) increases 
with the growth of book value of equity, and (d) increases with future abnormal ROE 
under unbiased accounting, which in turn increases with current abnormal ROE and 
economic rent proxies.20 Thus, the regression for the industry market-to-book ratio 
analysis is: 
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The industry subscript is dropped from all variables for ease of notation. The main effects 
of industry characteristics are included to capture the permanent level effect and their 
interactions with abnormal ROE are included to capture the persistence effect. Growth is 
defined as the percentage change in book value of equity. Other variables are defined as 
before (see Appendix B for variable measurement.) 
Table 6 reports the yearly regression results from equation (6) and, for comparison 
purposes, the results from two simpler specifications.21 Column A only includes current 
industry abnormal ROE and other factors. Column B controls for conservative accounting 
effects by adding estimated reserves. As expected, coefficients on estimated reserves are 
significantly positive. The adjusted R2 increases from 0.25 to 0.29, significant at the 0.01 
level. This suggests that incorporating conservative accounting effects helps explain the 
variation in the industry market-to-book ratio. 
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
Column C reports the results from the full model. Although coefficients on estimated 
reserves become insignificant after controlling for other industry characteristics, 
coefficients on most other industry characteristics are significant in the predicted 
directions. The adjusted R2 increases from 0.29 in Column B to 0.35 in Column C, 
significant at the 0.0036 level. Overall, these results suggest that incorporating economic 
and accounting characteristics helps explain the variation in the industry market-to-book 
ratio. 
 
The Firm Market-To-Book Ratio Analysis 
The regression for the firm market-to-book ratio analysis is constructed similarly: 
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The firm subscript is dropped from all variables except lagged industry market-to-book 
ratio ( 1t,j1t,j BV/MV −− ) and the estimated industry permanent abnormal ROE (
a
jEOˆR ), for 
which subscript j represents industry j to which the firm belongs. These two industry 
variables are included to capture the industry level market-to-book variation.22 The 
industry permanent abnormal ROE is estimated from rolling AR(1) regressions of 
abnormal ROE for individual industries, as explained in Section IV. Other variables are 
defined as before (see Appendix B for variable measurement.) 
Table 7 reports the yearly regression results from equation (7) and from two simpler 
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specifications to test the incremental explanatory power of conservative accounting and 
other firm characteristics separately. Column A includes lagged industry market-to-book 
ratio, the estimated industry permanent abnormal ROE, current firm differential abnormal 
ROE, and other factors. Column B controls for conservative accounting effects by adding 
estimated reserves. As expected, coefficients on estimated reserves are significantly 
positive. The adjusted R2 increases from 0.33 to 0.38, significant at the 0.0001 level. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Column C reports the results from the full model. As expected, coefficients on the 
cost of equity and on its interaction with firm differential abnormal ROE are significantly 
negative. Also as expected, coefficients on growth, market share, firm size, R&D 
intensity, and their interactions with firm differential abnormal ROE are significantly 
positive, except that firm size has an insignificant main effect and market share has an 
insignificant interaction effect. The adjusted R2 increases further from 0.38 in Column B 
to 0.44 in Column C, significant at the 0.0001 level. 
In sum, the market-to-book ratio analyses suggest that integrating determinants of 
abnormal ROE can significantly improve the RIM’s explanatory power for the market-to-
book ratio. Additional analyses are conducted to investigate how well this approach 
performs relative to models used in prior studies. For example, Fairfield et al. (1996) find 
that disaggregating earnings can improve forecasts of future ROE, and Bhojraj and Lee 
(2002) find that certain industry and firm characteristics, including industry market-to-
book ratio, firm profit margin, and analysts’ growth forecasts, can help explain the firm 
market-to-book ratio. The results, not reported for the sake of brevity, suggest that 
integrating determinants of abnormal ROE provides significant incremental explanatory 
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power over models used in prior research, such as Fairfield et al. (1996) in predicting 
future ROE and Bhojraj and Lee (2002) in explaining the firm market-to-book ratio.23  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates what determines abnormal ROE. It uses industry and firm 
characteristics suggested by economic theories to capture economic rents and develops an 
empirical measurethe conservative accounting factorto capture the impact of 
conservative accounting. The empirical analyses examine whether these determinants help 
predict future abnormal ROE and help explain the market-to-book ratio.  
As expected, industry abnormal ROE increases with industry concentration, industry 
level barriers to entry, and industry conservative accounting factors. Similarly, firm 
differential abnormal ROE increases with market share, firm size, firm level barriers to 
entry, and firm conservative accounting factors. The market-to-book ratio analyses further 
indicate that integrating these determinants of abnormal ROE into the RIM significantly 
increases its explanatory power for the variation in the market-to-book ratio. The adjusted 
R2 increases by 40 percent and 33 percent at the industry and firm levels, respectively, 
compared with a model with current abnormal ROE and other factors suggested by prior 
research (i.e., special items, total accruals, and the magnitude of abnormal ROE). 
Additional analyses indicate that these determinants provide incremental explanatory 
power over models analyzed in prior studies (e.g., Bhojraj and Lee 2002; Fairfield et al. 
1996). 
Overall, this paper contributes to the valuation literature by investigating 
determinants of abnormal ROE and by linking these determinants to firm value. The 
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analyses demonstrate the importance of these determinants in predicting future abnormal 
ROE and in explaining the market-to-book ratio. These results are important not only for 
improving valuation implementations, but also for studies relying on the RIM valuation 
framework, by suggesting a list of economic and accounting control variables that can 
capture the cross-sectional variation in firm value. 
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APPENDIX A  
Derivation of the Decomposition Equation (Equation 3)  
 
Equation (2) in the paper, 
1ttt
'
t ERERXX −−=− ,     (2) 
links the difference in net income (X) under the two accounting systems (unbiased accounting and 
conservative accounting) to the change in the estimated reserve (ER). Accounting numbers under unbiased 
accounting are denoted by “ ' ”.  
 
Dividing both sides of equation (2) by beginning-of-period book value of equity under conservative 
accounting yields: 
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The first term on the left-hand side of equation (2′) can be expressed as: 
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where 'atROE  (= rBV/X
'
1t
'
t −− ) is abnormal ROE under unbiased accounting. (Recall that ER is defined 
as: t
'
tt BVBVER −= .) The second term on the left-hand side of equation (2′), by the definition of 
abnormal ROE, can be expressed as: rROEBV/X at1tt +=− . 
 
Thus, the left-hand side of equation (2′) can be written as: 
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Substituting the above equation into equation (2′) yields: 
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After rearranging the terms of the above equation, one can obtain equation (3): 
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− −+= , referred to as the conservative accounting factor. 
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APPENDIX B  
Variable Measurement 
 
Variable 
Measurement 
(Compustat item numbers in parentheses) 
Panel A: Firm abnormal ROE 
Firm abnormal ROE Net income (#237)t/Book value of equity (#60)t-1 -cost of equity t 
Firm differential abnormal ROE Firm abnormal ROE - industry abnormal ROE 
Panel B: Firm market-to-book ratio 
Market-to-book ratio 
 
(Market value four months after fiscal-year-ends)t / (Book value of 
equity)t  
Panel C: Firm characteristics - economic rent proxies 
Market share Sales (#12)t /[Σ(Sales)t over the industry] 
Firm size Log(Assets (#6)t) 
Barriers to entry  
R&D intensity R&D expenditures (#46)t / Sales t  
Advertising intensity Advertising expenditures (#45)t / Sales t  
Capital intensity  Depreciation, depletion, and amortization expenses (#14)t / Sales t 
Panel D: Firm characteristics - conservative accounting factors 
Conservative accounting factors are calculated as:  
[(1+cost of equity t)(estimated reserve)t-1– (estimated reserve)t] /(Book value of equity)t-1.  
Two conservative accounting factors are calculated and the estimated reserve for each factor is calculated as follows. 
Estimated reserve - R&D  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The un-amortized portion of R&D assets generated by current and past 
R&D expenditures if these expenditures were capitalized. R&D assets are 
amortized using the coefficients reported in Lev and Sougiannis (1996). 
To reduce data restriction, the amortization period is chosen to be 5 years 
and the coefficients are adjusted proportionally such that they add up to 
one. Coefficients for “other industries” are used for an industry, unless 
coefficients for the industry are reported by Lev and Sougiannis. 
 
Estimated reserve - Advertising  
 
 
 
The un-amortized portion of advertising assets generated by current and 
past advertising expenditures if these expenditures were capitalized. As in 
Penman and Zhang (2002), advertising assets are amortized using an 
accelerated method (i.e., sum-of-year digits over two years). 
Panel E: Firm characteristics - other factors 
Special items |Special items (#17)t | / (Book value of equity)t-1  
Total accruals  |Total accruals (#18-#308) t | / (Book value of equity)t-1* 
Magnitude of firm differential  
abnormal ROE |Firm differential abnormal ROE| 
Panel F: Industry variable measurement 
Industry measures, except the Herfindahl index and the magnitude of industry abnormal ROE, are weighted averages 
of accompanying firm measures. The weight used for each measure is specified below. 
Industry abnormal ROE Beginning-of-period book value of equity is the weight. 
Market-to-book ratio Book value of equity is the weight. 
Barriers to entry Sales is the weight. 
Conservative accounting factors Beginning-of-period book value of equity is the weight. 
Special items and total accruals Beginning-of-period book value of equity is the weight. 
Herfindahl Index Sum of squared market shares in the industry. 
Magnitude of industry abnormal ROE |Industry abnormal ROE| 
 
* If operating cash flows (#308) is missing or unavailable (prior to 1987), it is estimated as: funds from 
operations (#110) - change in current assets (#4) + change in current liabilities (#5) + change in cash and 
cash equivalents (#1) - change in current portion of long-term debt (#34). Current portion of long-term debt 
is set to be zero if it is reported as missing in the Compustat. 
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1 See Lee (1999) and Lo and Lys (2000) for reviews of RIM-based studies. 
 
2 Prior research generally focuses either on economic rents or on conservative accounting. One exception is 
a concurrent study, Jansen (2002), which also investigates both effects. Compared to Jansen (2002), this 
paper uses a more comprehensive set of economic rent proxies and allows both the persistence and the 
permanent level of firm performance to vary with economic rents and conservative accounting factors, 
instead of attributing the permanent level to conservative accounting effects and the persistence to economic 
rents, as done in Jansen (2002).  
 
3 An exception to this rule is that firms can capitalize R&D expenditures associated with computer software 
development incurred after the establishment of technological feasibility. 
 
4 Equation (3) suggests that conservative accounting also affects abnormal ROE through the lagged 
estimated reserve (the second term). Given that on average economic rents ( 'atROE ) are zero due to 
competition, the lagged estimated reserve is not correlated with abnormal ROE in a cross-sectional setting; 
for simplicity, it is not considered in the empirical analyses. Explicitly controlling for the lagged estimated 
reserve does not affect the inferences. 
 
5 To see how the conservative accounting factor is contingent on growth, one can rewrite CAFt as 
1t1tt,ER BV/ER)gr( −−− , where g ER,t ( 11 −−−= ttt ER/]ERER[ ) stands for the growth of the estimated reserve. 
Thus, a conservative accounting policy has a negative impact on abnormal ROE for firms with high growth 
in investments recorded conservatively and a positive impact for firms with low or no growth in those 
investments.  
 
6 This is empirically confirmed based on 219 industries and 1,052 firms with at least 25 consecutive years of 
data on abnormal ROE. The difference in abnormal ROE persistence (estimated from AR(1) processes) 
between a firm and the industry to which it belongs has a wide range. For an industry with a persistence of 
0.55 (the sample average), half of the firms in the industry have a persistence higher than 0.65 or lower than 
0.33. 
 
7 Combining the industry and firm analyses together, while still allowing the two components to have 
different persistence, does not change the inferences but makes result presentations cumbersome. 
 
8 Although certain industry characteristics are used to explain industry performance, special features of 
regulated industries, such as regulations on the rate of return, still warrant separate analyses. See Nwaeze 
(2000) for a detailed discussion of electric utilities. 
 
9  This low correlation reflects the underlying low association between the level and the growth of R&D 
expenditures.  
 
10 Nevertheless, readers should interpret the results with caution. Using R&D and advertising intensity to 
proxy for economic rents is somewhat arbitrary and might capture conservative accounting effects. Also, the 
CAF measure is sensitive to the amortization method and the cost of equity estimation. 
 
11 The reason for the negative mean abnormal ROE could be that: (1) the equity premium is overestimated; 
(2) bankrupt firms included in the Compustat Research file have low or negative ROE; or (3) firms with 
high growth in R&D or advertising expenditures in the sample period have negative abnormal ROE because 
of conservative accounting. Firms in the last two scenarios are generally small and have lower weight in 
calculating the mean industry abnormal ROE (book-value-weighted average of firm abnormal ROE) than in 
calculating the mean firm abnormal ROE (equal-weighted average). This explains why the mean firm 
abnormal ROE is more negative than the mean industry abnormal ROE. 
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12 As reported in Panel B, firm size is highly correlated with market share. This high correlation could lead 
to insignificant coefficients on firm size and market share even if they jointly have significant explanatory 
power. Accordingly, the regression analyses use residuals from yearly regressions of firm size on market 
share to capture the incremental impact of firm size beyond market share. The underlying assumption of this 
approach is that market share is a more fundamental economic construct. 
 
13 Unlike this paper, prior research generally assumes the parameters to be constant across firms and over 
time. 
 
14 This paper uses Wald tests to compare explanatory power of alternative model specifications and reports 
median p-values of yearly Wald tests.  
 
15 This relatively small improvement partly results from not controlling for the variation in the permanent 
level, as discussed later. 
 
16 Using realized future industry abnormal ROE is inconsistent with forecasting purposes. Predicted future 
industry abnormal ROE is estimated from rolling AR(1) regressions of abnormal ROE for individual 
industries. For example, to predict an industry’s abnormal ROE in 1990, all available abnormal ROE of the 
industry up to 1989 (since 1963) are used to estimate an AR(1) process. The estimated parameters and 
abnormal ROE in 1989 are then used to predict industry abnormal ROE in 1990. To ensure the accuracy of 
estimating AR(1), at least 12 time-series observations are used. 
 
17 To see this, one can write an AR(1) process as: 1t
a
t0
a
1t ROEROE ++ ++= ερφ . Taking expectations of 
both sides yields: )()( at0
a
1t ROEEROEE ρφ +=+ . Denoting the mean abnormal ROE as ROEa and 
rearranging terms, one can obtain: )( ρφ −= 1ROE a0 ; that is, the intercept is the product of the mean and 
one minus the persistence. Expressing the intercept in the AR(1) process this way yields the regression 
equation.  
 
18 The idea of the non-linear OLS regression is similar to that of the OLS regression: minimizing the sum of 
squared errors. Basically, estimates of the coefficients are revised repeatedly to reduce the sum of squared 
errors; an optimal set of coefficient estimates is found when no further improvement can be obtained. 
 
19 The market-to-book ratio analyses have slightly different samples from the abnormal ROE analyses 
because the former require data on market value and the latter require data on future abnormal ROE. 
 
20 See Cheng (2002) for a detailed discussion of the link from determinants of abnormal ROE to the market-
to-book ratio. Theoretically, conservative accounting effects should also be controlled for by adjusting 
abnormal ROE for CAF. For simplicity, the analyses here do not make such adjustments; doing so does not 
affect the inferences. 
 
21 All observations with an absolute value of R-student measure greater than three are identified as outliers 
and excluded (Belsley et al. 1980). Note that the abnormal ROE analyses do not identify or exclude outliers 
because doing so requires information about future abnormal ROE and is inconsistent with forecasting 
purposes. 
 
22 Using contemporaneous industry market-to-book ratio is inconsistent with valuation purposes. 
 
23 The adjusted R2 after integrating determinants of abnormal ROE into the model used in Fairfield et al. 
(Bhojraj and Lee) is 0.06 (0.11) higher, a relative increase of 20 percent (31 percent). Both increases are 
significant at the 0.001 level based on Wald tests. See Cheng (2002) for details. 
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Descriptive statistics on all variables, except the market-to-book ratio and estimated reserves, are based on 
the sample for the abnormal ROE analysis: 22,536 firm-year observations in the period 1976-1997 for firm 
level analyses and 3,270 industry-year observations in the same period for industry level analyses. 
Descriptive statistics on the market-to-book ratio and estimated reserves are based on the sample for the 
market-to-book ratio analysis: 19,898 firm-year observations for firm level analyses and 3,396 industry-year 
observations for industry level analyses. See Appendix B for variable measurement. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on industry and firm characteristics 
 Industry level  Firm level 
Variable Mean Median  Mean Median 
Abnormal ROE -0.017 -0.010  -0.053 -0.031 
Firm differential abnormal ROE NA NA  -0.024 -0.006 
Cost of equity 0.136 0.140  0.139 0.142 
Market-to-book ratio 1.947 1.848  1.944 1.374 
Market share NA NA  0.049 0.008 
Firm size NA NA  4.961 4.835 
Concentration  0.236 0.208  NA NA 
Barriers to entry       
R&D intensity  0.015 0.007  0.034 0.012 
Advertising intensity  0.020 0.012  0.019 0.010 
Capital intensity  0.040 0.032  0.039 0.030 
Estimated reserves (scaled by book value of equity)      
R&D 0.088 0.080  0.161 0.069 
Advertising 0.025 0.021  0.021 0.007 
Conservative accounting factors      
R&D 0.005 0.001  0.005 0.000 
Advertising 0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 
Other factors      
Special items 0.025 0.012  0.023 0.000 
Total accruals 0.174 0.152  0.184 0.123 
Magnitude of industry or firm differential abnormal ROE 0.069 0.050  0.122 0.076 
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TABLE 1 (continued)  
 
Panel B Correlations between variables 
The upper (lower) triangle reports Spearman correlations between variables at the industry (firm) level. Abnormal ROE refers to industry abnormal ROE in the 
upper triangle and firm differential abnormal ROE in the lower triangle. Unless noted, the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
        
Conservative 
accounting factor   
 
Abnormal 
ROE 
Market 
share 
Firm 
size Concentration
R&D 
intensity 
Advertising 
intensity 
Capital 
intensity R&D Advertising
Special 
items 
Total 
accruals
Abnormal ROE  NA NA 0.03# -0.01# 0.15 -0.14 0.15 0.16 -0.25 -0.17 
Market share 0.15  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Firm size 0.18 0.72  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Concentration NA NA NA  -0.02# -0.07 -0.04 0.05 0.03# -0.13 -0.09 
R&D intensity -0.03 -0.21 0.04 NA  -0.10 0.36 0.30 -0.01# 0.11 -0.05 
Advertising intensity 0.03 0.01 0.02 NA 0.05  -0.21 -0.09 -0.02# 0.08 -0.08 
Capital intensity -0.18 -0.09 0.16 NA 0.29 -0.12  0.15 -0.04 0.23 0.21 
Conservative accounting factor- R&D 0.22 0.05 0.00# NA -0.05 -0.08 0.03  0.22 0.09 0.02# 
Conservative accounting factor- advertising 0.15 0.02 0.00# NA -0.02 0.01# 0.01 0.07  0.03# -0.01# 
Special items -0.24 0.03 0.12 NA 0.08 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.06  0.30 
Total accruals -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 NA -0.05 -0.03 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.17  
 
#   The correlation is insignificant at the 0.05 level.
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TABLE 2  
The Industry Abnormal ROE Analysis 
 
1tt
a
t4t
a
t3
t
a
t2t
a
t1
a
t00
a
1t
factorsOtherROEfactorsaccountingveConservatiROE
entrytoBarriersROEionConcentratROEROEROE
+
+
+×+×
+×+×++=
εαα
αααφ
 (4) 
a
tROE  is industry abnormal ROE. The industry subscript is dropped from all variables for ease of notation. 
See Appendix B for variable measurement. The analysis is based on 3,270 industry-year observations in the 
period 1976-1997. Regressions are estimated yearly and industry characteristics are mean-adjusted within 
each year. Reported coefficients and adjusted R2 are yearly averages. T-statistics for the average coefficients 
are reported (Fama and MacBeth 1973). Wald tests are used to test whether the explanatory power of the 
model specification in Column B is higher than that in Column A. The median p-value of yearly Wald tests 
is reported. 
 Predicted Column A  Column B 
 signs Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Intercept ? -0.00 -3.06  -0.00 -4.88 
ROEa + 0.79 27.29  0.79 25.40 
ROEa × Concentration +    0.05 0.48 
ROEa × Barriers to entry       
R&D intensity +    0.62 1.69 
Advertising intensity +    2.75 3.04 
Capital intensity ?    1.17 2.28 
ROEa × Conservative accounting factors       
R&D  +    0.69 1.88 
Advertising +    -2.49 0.74 
ROEa × Other factors       
Special items - -3.21 -2.33  -3.45 -2.85 
Total accruals - -0.31 -1.96  -0.21 -1.66 
Magnitude of industry abnormal ROE - -0.14 -0.78  -0.07 -0.29 
Adjusted R2  0.61   0.64  
P-value of Wald test     0.0257  
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TABLE 3  
The Firm Abnormal ROE Analysis 
 
1tt
a
t5
t
a
t4t
a
t3
t
a
t2t
a
t1
a
t0
a
1t,j10
a
1t
factorsOtherDROE
factorsaccountingveConservatiDROEentrytoBarriersDROE
sizeFirmDROEshareMarketDROEDROEEOˆRROE
+
++
+×
+×+×
+×+×+++=
εα
αα
αααφφ
  (5) 
a
tROE  is firm abnormal ROE, 
a
t,jEOˆR 1+ is predicted future industry abnormal ROE, and atDROE is firm 
differential abnormal ROE. The firm subscript is dropped from all variables except a t,jEOˆR 1+ , for which 
subscript j represents industry j to which the firm belongs. See Appendix B for variable measurement. The 
analysis is based on 22,536 firm-year observations in the period 1976-1997. Regressions are estimated 
yearly and firm characteristics are mean-adjusted within each year. Reported coefficients and adjusted R2 are 
yearly averages. T-statistics for the average coefficients are reported (Fama and MacBeth 1973). Wald tests 
are used to test whether the explanatory power of the model specification in Column B is higher than that in 
Column A. The median p-value of yearly Wald tests is reported. 
 Predicted  Column A  Column B 
 signs  Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Intercept ?  -0.04 -5.40  -0.03 -5.27 
Predicted future industry abnormal ROE +  0.78 18.27  0.79 18.28
DROEa +  0.62 34.77  0.61 29.44
DROEa × Market share +     0.17 2.00 
DROEa × Firm size +     0.01 1.98 
DROEa × Barriers to entry        
R&D intensity +     0.45 2.07 
Advertising intensity +     1.07 2.66 
Capital intensity ?     0.82 2.41 
DROEa × Conservative accounting factors        
R&D  +     0.31 2.30 
Advertising +     -0.38 -0.42 
DROEa × Other factors        
Special items -  -0.84 -10.33  -0.94 -10.94
Total accruals -  -0.19 -4.07  -0.15 -3.16 
Magnitude of firm differential abnormal ROE -  -0.20 -2.37  -0.26 -3.01 
Adjusted R2   0.30   0.34  
P-value of Wald test      0.0003  
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TABLE 4  
The Industry Abnormal ROE Analysis  
– Explaining Both the Persistence and the Permanent Level 
 
This table reports the results from the following regression that allows both the persistence of industry 
abnormal ROE and its permanent level to vary with economic rent proxies and conservative accounting 
factors: 
1t
a
t
aa
1t ROE)1(ROEROE ++ ++−= ερρ , 
where the permanent level (ROEa) and the persistence (ρ) are expressed as: 
t4
t3t2t10
t3t2t10
a
factorsOther
factorsaccountingveConservatientrytoBarriersionConcentrat
factorsaccountingveConservatientrytoBarriersionConcentratROE
α
ααααρ
ββββ
+
+++=
+++=
 
a
tROE is industry abnormal ROE. The industry subscript is dropped from all variables for ease of notation. 
See Appendix B for variable measurement. The analysis is based on 3,270 industry-year observations in the 
period 1976-1997. Regressions are estimated yearly using the non-linear OLS regression method and 
industry characteristics are mean-adjusted within each year. Reported coefficients and adjusted R2 are yearly 
averages. T-statistics for the average coefficients are reported (Fama and MacBeth 1973). Wald tests are 
used to test whether the explanatory power of the model specification in Column B is higher than that in 
Column A. The median p-value of yearly Wald tests is reported. 
 Predicted Column A  Column B 
 signs Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Explaining the persistence (α0, α1, …, α4) 
Intercept + 0.82 27.80  0.82 22.80 
Concentration +    0.02 0.17 
Barriers to entry       
R&D intensity +    2.12 2.84 
Advertising intensity +    1.92 2.85 
Capital intensity ?    0.78 2.21 
Conservative accounting factors       
R&D  +    0.94 1.97 
Advertising +    1.60 0.46 
Other factors       
Special items - -2.99 -2.03  -2.77 -5.87 
Total accruals - -0.25 -1.42  -0.34 -2.84 
Magnitude of industry abnormal ROE - -0.03 -0.92  -0.12 -2.54 
Explaining the permanent level (β0, β1, …, β3) 
Intercept ? 0.06 1.23  0.03 1.99 
Concentration +    0.06 2.25 
Barriers to entry       
R&D intensity +    2.47 2.06 
Advertising intensity +    0.92 2.55 
Capital intensity ?    -1.48 -1.58 
Conservative accounting factors       
R&D  +    2.61 1.73 
Advertising +    7.27 2.97 
Adjusted R2  0.61   0.67  
P-value of Wald test     0.0012  
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TABLE 5  
The Firm Abnormal ROE Analysis  
– Explaining Both the Persistence and the Permanent Level 
 
This table reports the results from the following regression that allows both the persistence of firm 
differential abnormal ROE and its permanent level to vary with economic rent proxies and conservative 
accounting factors: 
1t
a
t
aa
1t,j1
a
1t DROE)1(DROEEˆROROE +++ ++−+= ερρφ , 
where the permanent level (DROEa) and the persistence (ρ) are expressed as 
t5
t4t3t2t10
t4t3t2t10
a
factorsOther
factorsaccountingveConservatientrytoBarrierssizeFirmshareMarket
factorsaccountingveConservatientrytoBarrierssizeFirmshareMarketDROE
α
αααααρ
βββββ
+
++++=
++++=
 
a
tROE  is firm abnormal ROE, 
a
t,jEOˆR 1+ is predicted future industry abnormal ROE, and atDROE is firm 
differential abnormal ROE. The firm subscript is dropped from all variables except a t,jEOˆR 1+ , for which 
subscript j represents industry j to which the firm belongs. See Appendix B for variable measurement. The 
analysis is based on 22,536 firm-year observations in the period 1976-1997. Regressions are estimated 
yearly using the non-linear OLS regression method and firm characteristics are mean-adjusted within each 
year. Reported coefficients and adjusted R2 are yearly averages. T-statistics for the average coefficients are 
reported (Fama and MacBeth 1973). Wald tests are used to test whether the explanatory power of the model 
specification in Column B is higher than that in Column A. The median p-value of yearly Wald tests is 
reported. 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
 Predicted  Column A  Column B 
 signs  Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
 
Predicted future industry abnormal ROE (φ1) 
 
+ 
  
0.77 
 
18.87  0.76 19.37
Explaining the persistence (α0, α1, …, α5) 
Intercept +  0.60 30.14  0.60 24.24
Market share +     0.17 2.30 
Firm size +     0.02 2.00 
Barriers to entry        
R&D intensity +     0.15 1.82 
Advertising intensity +     0.14 2.16 
Capital intensity ?     0.17 2.35 
Conservative accounting factors        
R&D  +     0.58 2.40 
Advertising +     -0.89 -0.79 
Other factors        
Special items -  -0.84 -9.03  -1.06 -11.17
Total accruals -  -0.16 -3.73  -0.16 -3.65 
Magnitude of firm differential abnormal ROE -  -0.24 -3.22  -0.25 -4.08 
Explaining the permanent level (β0, β1, …, β4) 
Intercept ?  -0.11 -5.28  -0.11 -4.40 
Market share +     0.48 4.67 
Firm size +     0.02 3.45 
Barriers to entry        
R&D intensity +     0.32 1.67 
Advertising intensity +     -0.31 -0.96 
Capital intensity ?     -0.92 -2.95 
Conservative accounting factors        
R&D  +     0.28 1.66 
Advertising +     0.72 0.63 
Adjusted R2   0.31   0.37  
P-value of Wald test      0.0001  
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TABLE 6  
The Industry Market-to-book Ratio Analysis 
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  (6) 
MV is market value, BV is book value of equity, ER is the estimated reserve, and atROE  is industry 
abnormal ROE. The industry subscript is dropped from all variables for ease of notation. See Appendix B 
for variable measurement. The analysis is based on 3,396 industry-year observations in the period 1976-
1997. Regressions are estimated yearly and industry characteristics are mean-adjusted within each year. 
Reported coefficients and adjusted R2 are yearly averages. T-statistics for the average coefficients are 
reported (Fama and MacBeth 1973). Wald tests are used to test whether the explanatory power of the model 
specification in one column is higher than that in the previous column. The median p-value of yearly Wald 
tests is reported. 
 Predicted Column A Column B  Column C 
 signs Coefficient t Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Intercept + 1.97 8.34 1.92 9.15  2.25 5.22
Estimated reserves         
R&D +   0.61 2.28  -0.40 -0.88
Advertising +   2.75 3.23  -0.27 -0.19
Cost of equity -      -1.30 -1.99
Growth  +      0.01 0.05
Concentration +      -0.62 -0.11
Barriers to entry         
R&D intensity +      5.35 2.37
Advertising intensity +      3.75 2.82
Capital intensity ?      -1.88 -2.80
ROEa + 5.33 15.61 6.50 17.20  5.05 13.09
ROEa × Cost of equity -      1.28 0.17
ROEa × Growth  +      1.06 2.09
ROEa × Concentration +      0.41 1.63
ROEa × Barriers to entry         
R&D intensity +      24.62 1.93
Advertising intensity +      11.22 1.63
Capital intensity ?      -9.74 -1.19
ROEa × Other factors         
Special items - -12.04 -2.66 -10.30 -2.46  -7.09 -1.88
Total accruals - -5.34 -4.65 -5.12 -4.76  -4.26 -2.46
Magnitude of industry abnormal ROE - -5.91 -3.15 -4.77 -2.58  -7.85 -3.65
Adjusted R2  0.25  0.29   0.35  
P-value of Wald test    0.0092   0.0036  
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TABLE 7  
The Firm Market-to-book Ratio Analysis 
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 (7) 
MV is market value, BV is book value of equity, ajEOˆR is the estimated industry permanent abnormal ROE, 
ER is the estimated reserve, and atDROE is firm differential abnormal ROE. The firm subscript is dropped 
from all variables except 1t,j1t,j BV/MV −− and
a
jEOˆR , for which subscript j represents industry j to which 
the firm belongs. See Appendix B for variable measurement. The analysis is based on 19,898 firm-year 
observations in the period 1976-1997. Regressions are estimated yearly and firm characteristics are mean-
adjusted within each year. Reported coefficients and adjusted R2 are yearly averages. T-statistics for the 
average coefficients are reported (Fama and MacBeth 1973). Wald test is used to test whether the 
explanatory power of the model specification in one column is higher than that in the previous column. The 
median p-value of yearly Wald tests is reported. 
 Predicted Column A Column B  Column C 
 signs Coefficient t Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Intercept + 1.16 7.70 0.97 7.44  1.06 7.96 
Lagged industry market-to-book ratio + 0.36 14.04 0.35 14.51  0.33 12.85
Industry permanent abnormal ROE + 4.31 7.68 3.33 7.06  2.68 6.11 
Estimated reserves         
R&D +   1.33 10.93  0.60 4.60 
Advertising +   1.23 2.26  1.90 2.95 
Cost of equity -      -2.74 -3.01 
Growth +      0.15 2.35 
Market share +      0.55 2.14 
Firm size +      0.02 1.32 
Barriers to entry         
R&D intensity +      3.77 5.32 
Advertising intensity +      0.04 0.06 
Capital intensity ?      0.14 0.20 
DROEa + 5.21 16.01 5.27 15.21  5.10 18.67
DROEa × Cost of equity -      -26.44 -5.85 
DROEa × Growth +      0.50 3.27 
DROEa × Market share +      -3.03 -0.74 
DROEa × Firm size +      0.40 4.33 
DROEa × Barriers to entry         
R&D intensity +      3.90 3.40 
Advertising intensity +      7.17 2.96 
Capital intensity ?      -10.72 -3.25 
DROEa × Other factors         
Special items - -1.96 -2.71 -2.11 -3.62  -2.36 -2.64 
Total accruals - 0.07 0.21 -0.22 -0.58  -0.84 -2.14 
Magnitude of firm differential 
abnormal ROE 
- -9.24 -10.65 -8.09 -10.42  -6.98 
 
-9.86 
 
Adjusted R2  0.33  0.38   0.44  
P-value of Wald test    0.0001   0.0001  
 
